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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
NORTHCOAST ENVIRONMENTAL CENTER v. GLICKMAN 
136 F.3d 660 (9th Cir. 1998) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Northcoast Environmental Center v. Glickman, I the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
a less deferential standard of "reasonableness" applied to its 
review of legal questions that determined the applicability of 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA,). 2 Thus, when 
no facts are in dispute, an agency's decision not to prepare an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)"will be upheld unless it 
is unreasonable.s When facts are in dispute, however, the Su-
preme Court decision of Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources 
Council,4 which applied an "arbitrary and capricious" standard 
of review, controls. 5 
The Ninth Circuit also decided that district court had not 
abused its discretion by declining to follow an exception to the 
Mministrative Procedure Act (AP A), 6 which allows a judge to 
1. 136 F.3d 660 (9th Cir. 1998). The appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California was argued and submitted on November 6, 1997 
before Judge Harlington Wood, Jr., Judge Rymer, and Judge Tashima. The opinion, 
authored by Judge Wood, was filed on February 17, 1998. 
2. See Northcoast Environmental Center v. Glickman, 136 F.3d 660, 667 (9th Cir. 
1998). The heart of National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U .S.C. 4321 (1994), 
is the requirement found at 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), which states, "all agencies of the 
Federal Government shall ... (C) include in every recommendation or report on propos-
als for legislation and other mll,jor Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of 
the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official.. .. " 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(2)(C) (1994). 
3. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 666. 
4. 490 U.S. 360 (1989). 
5. See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. at 375-76 
6. Administrative Procedure Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 105-220, 60 Stat. 237 (codi-




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
90 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:89 
look beyond the administrative record in an appeal. 7 The dis-
trict court refused to look at documents outside the record 
based on a rmding that they were unnecessary and 
cumulative.8 The Ninth Circuit agreed even though Northcoast 
Environmental Center's documents fit within an exception to 
the APA9 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1987, the United States Department of Agriculture's For-
est Service (Forest Service) and the United States Department 
of Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) formed an 
Inter-Regional Coordinating Group.l0 This group studied Port-
Orford Cedar (POC) trees, a valuable component of the north-
western California ecosystem, which had fallen victim to a 
deadly funguS.ll The Forest Service developed a POC Action 
Plan to inventory, monitor, study, and manage the POC ecosys-
tem, and to educate the public about that ecosystem. 12 The 
BLM developed Management Guidelines to supplement the 
Action Plan. 13 The Management Guidelines included manage-
ment objectives, implementation strategies, specifications for 
equipment washing, lists of fungus control strategies and tim-
ber and service contract mitigation measures. 14 The Forest 
Service's Regional Foresters approved the POC Action Plan in 
June of 1988.15 
Northcoast Environmental Center (NEC), a local conserva-
tion organization working to improve and preserve environ-
generally limited to review of the administrative record. Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 665 
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1998)). 
7. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 665. The district court declined to admit exhibits 
that the Northcoast Environmental Center (NEC) had offered into evidence. See id. 
8. See id. 
9. See id. 
10. See Northcoast Environmental Center v. Glickman, 136 F.3d 660, 663 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
11. See id. 
12. See id. 
13. See id. at 664. 
14. See id. 
15. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 663. The opinion does not state whether and when 
the Management Guidelines were also al?proved. 
2
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mental quality in northwestern California,16 disagreed with the 
approval of the POC Action Plan!7 Initially, NEC filed a com-
plaint with the Deputy Chief of the Forest Service, and the 
Deputy Chief denied it. 18 NEC then filed a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia seeking a temporary restraining order.19 However, NEC 
voluntarily dismissed the action when the court denied its re-
quest.20 
On January 5, 1995, after the Action Plan and Management 
Guidelines were completed, NEC, joined by various other envi-
ronmental groups, sued the Secretaries of the Departments of 
Agriculture and Interior seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).21 
Specifically, NEC sought to enjoin logging restrictions and road 
closings within POC groves until the Secretaries completed an 
EIS, as required by NEPA 22 
Under NEPA, all federal agencies are required to prepare 
an EIS, a detailed statement of adverse environmental im-
pacts, for every major federal action that significantly affects 
16. Biography of Northcoast Environmental Center, allailable in Westlaw, Busi-
ness and Industry Information: Careers in the Law: Directories: Encyclopedia of Asso-
ciations. 
17. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 664. NEC disagreed with the approval of the POC 
Action Plan because it believed that the Forest Service should have prepared an Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement before the Plan was approved. See id. 
18. See id. at 663. 
19. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 663. NEC appealed the approval to the Forest 
Service on August 18, 1988. See id. Almost a year later, the Regional Foresters re-
sponded with a letter to NEC. See id. The letter informally declared "the POC Action 
Plan did not require an EIS because the Plan did not provide for specific actions, but 
merely represented 'the beginning of a planning process.m [d. On October 20, 1988, 
NEC was formally denied the appeal when the Deputy Chief of the Forest Service 
wrote, "'The action plan does not represent a specific proposal with the environmental 
consequences that can be meaningfully evaluated at this time.m [d. 
20. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 663. NEC dismissed the action on March 19, 1991. 
See id. 
21. See id. at 664. NEC sought a declaration by the court stating that the Secre-
taries were required to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for their Action 
and Management Plans. See id. at 662. 
22. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 662. NEC stated that both projects were substan-
tially similar to other "federal, interregional disease control and timber management" 
projecta for which the Forest Service and BLM had prepared EISs and, therefore, the 
agencies should have prepared EISs for the current projects as well. See id. at 667. 
3
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the quality of the human environment.23 The Government 
claimed that its Action Plan and Management Guidelines did 
not have significant enough effects to trigger the NEPA re-
quirements.24 On October 23, 1996, the district court agreed 
and granted the Government's motion for summary judgment 
and motion to strike NEC's exhibits.25 NEC filed an appeal to 
the Ninth Circuit on November 4,1996.26 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND NEPA APPLICABILITY 
The main issue before the Ninth Circuit was whether the 
inter-regional POC program, comprised of the Forest Services' 
Action Plan and the BLM's Management Guidelines, consti-
tuted a major federal action requiring a programmatic EIS.27 
The court fIrst examined the standard of review for appeals 
from agency decisions.26 While NEC argued that the court 
should select the same "reasonableness" standard as it applied 
in Friends of the Earth v. Hintz,29 the Government contended 
that the "arbitrary and capricious standard" used by the Su-
preme Court in Marsh was the appropriate test.30 
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994). 
24. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 667. aIn support, the Secretaries assert that these 
[projects) are merely 'research, development, and information-gathering tool[s) in-
tended to lay the groundwork for later decision making.... ld. 
25. See id. at 664. 
26. See id. 
27. See Northcoast Environmental Center v. Glickman, 136 F.3d 660, 665 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
28. See id. at 666. 
29. 800 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1986). In Friends, environmental groups filed a suit 
against the District Engineer of the Army Corps of Engineers for issuing a permit 
authorizing a logging company to discharge fill material into a wetland area. See 
Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F .2d at 826-827. The district court upheld the per-
mit issuance and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. See id. at 828, 839. The Ninth Circuit 
also upheld the Corps' decision to not prepare an EIS based on its finding that aan 
agency's decision that a particular project does not require preparation of an EIS is to 
be upheld unless it is unreasonable." ld. at 836. Given the extensive administrative 
record and considerations taken, the court felt the Corps' decision was reasonable. See 
id. at 838. 
30. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 666 (citing Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources 
Council, 490 u.S. 360 (1989». In Marsh, a group of nonprofit organizations sued the 
4
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IDtimately, the Ninth Circuit held the "reasonableness" 
standard to be the proper standard of review.31 In doing so, the 
court examined Marsh and the subsequent split in the circuits 
regarding Marsh's breadth.32 In Marsh, a unanimous Supreme 
Court, held "that substantive NEPA decisions by an agency are 
reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard."33 This 
standard of review examines whether the agency considered all 
the relevant factors, articulated a rational connection between 
the facts found and the choice made, and whether the agency 
committed a clear error of judgment. 34 
Subsequent circuit courts, however, have both limited and 
broadened Marsh's ruling.35 The Eleventh Circuit read Marsh 
broadly, applying it to all agency actions involving NEPA 36 
The Eighth and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand, limited 
Marsh by determining that Marsh does not control when the 
threshold question is whether an EIS should have been pre-
pared in the first instance.37 Rather, these circuits held that 
the standard of review at the threshold stage should be "rea-
sonableness. »38 
The Ninth Circuit followed the narrower approach.39 In 
Greenpeace Action v. Franklin40 and Alaska Wilderness Recrea-
Secretary of the Army Corps of Engineers to eqjoin construction of a dam. See Marsh, 
490 U.S. at 368. The organizations claimed the Corps violated NEPA by failing to 
prepare a supplemental EIS to review new information. See ill. A unanimous Supreme 
Court, after referencing section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1998), held that a court would only set aside such an agency deci-
sion if it was arbitrary and capricious. See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 375. Section 706(2) of 
the APA provides "that a reviewing court shall (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action, findings, and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law .... " 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1998). 
31. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 667. 
32. See ill. 
33. [d. at 666 (citing Marsh, 490 U.S. 366-67 (1989». 
34. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 666 (citing California Trout v. Schaefer, 58 F.3d 
469,473 (9th Cir. 1995». 
35. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 666-67. 
36. See ill. at 667 (citing North Buckhead Civic Ass'n v. Skinner, 903 F.2d 1533, 
1538 (11th Cir. 1990». 
37. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 666-67 (citing Goos v. I.C.C., 911 F.2d 1283, 1292 
(8th Cir. 1990); Sierra Club v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 362, 367 (10th Cir. 1991). 
38. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 667. 
39. See ill. 
5
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twn & Tourism v. Morrison;u the Ninth Circuit separated the 
standard of review for factual issues from that for legal 
issues.42 The court held that agency decisions regarding factual 
or technical matters, as in Marsh, are to be reviewed under the 
"arbitrary and capricious" standard, while legal issues are to be 
reviewed under the "reasonableness" standard. 43 
The court found that NEC's claim primarily concerned "le-
gal issues ... based on undisputed historical facts. "44 Thus, it 
applied the "less deferential standard of reasonableness."411 The 
court provided two underlying reasons for determining that the 
Government's decision not to prepare an EIS was reasonable. 
First, as the district court found, neither project was a final 
agency action!6 The lack of finality not only made the court's 
review difficult, but made the determination of environmental 
40. 14 F.3d 1324 (9th Cir. 1992). In Greenpeace, the North Pacific Fishery Man-
agement Council issued its Fishery Management Plan and an EIS for the Gulf of 
Alaska pursuant to the Fisheries Conservation Management Act. See Greenpeace 
Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d at 1327. The plan provided that the Council set annual 
harvest levels of various species. See ill. Greenpeace objected to an increase in the 
annual harve6t levels, claiming the increase would jeopardize a threatened species of 
sea lion. See ill. at 1328-1329. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the objections turned 
on factual determinations rather than legal ones. See ill. at 1331. Consequently, the 
court claimed that "arbitrary and capricious" was the appropriate standard of review 
for the agency's decision. See id. 
41. 67 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 1995). In Alaska Wilderness, environmentalist6 sued to 
enjoin the Forest Service from offering contracts for certain timber sales on the Ton-
gass National Forest. See Alaska Wilderness Recreation & Tourism v. Morrison, 67 
F.3d at 725. The environmentalist6 believed that the Forest Service should have sup-
plemented three EISs after a certain contract for timber had been cancelled. See ill. at 
726,728. The Ninth Circuit determined that the circumstances for requiring a sup-
plemental EIS were purely legal and applied the "reasonableness" standard of review. 
See ill. at 727. 
42. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 667. 
43. See ill. 
44. Id~ 
45. Id. at 667. Neither party objected to the underlying facts surrounding the 
case, that is, the components and objectives of both projects; therefore, there was no 
factual issue. See id. The legal issue was the proper classification of the projects as 
-major, Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" 
requiring an EIS. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994). 
46. See Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 668. Section 704 of the Administrative Procedure 
Act states that an -[a)gency action [is) made reviewable by statute and fmal agency 
action.... A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not di-
rectly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.- 5 U.S.C. 
§ 704 (1988). 
6
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consequences difficult for the Government as well. 47 Accord-
ingly, because NEPA "does not require an agency to consider 
the environmental effects that speculative or hypothetical proj-
ects might have on a proposed project,"48 a non~final agency 
action, such as the POC Action Plan and Management Guide-
lines, did not require the preparation of an EIS.49 
Second, the court held that even if the projects were final, 
they would not require an EIS. NEPA requires an EIS "for 
'every legislation and other major Federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment. mllO Both proj-
ects "set forth guidelines and goals for POC research, manage-
ment strategies and information sharing" as well as "POC 
preservation and timber sales. "111 Neither project had an actual 
or immediate effect on the POC ecosystem as they were pri-
marily for research.1l2 Therefore, the court concluded that the 
projects were not major federal actions./lS Further, since nei-
ther project proposed a specific activity that directly impacted 
the physical environment, the projects failed to meet the last 
NEPA requirement: that the projects cause a significant impact 
on the quality of the human environment.1l4 Thus, the court 
found the Government made a reasonable decision in not pre-
paring an EIS.1lIl 
B. STRICKEN AGENCY DOCUMENTS 
The court also resolved the minor issue of whether the dis-
trict court erred in striking NEC exhibits.1l6 While the general 
rule of section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act limits 
judicial review of agency decisions to the administrative record, 
47. See Northcoost, 136 F.3d at 668. 
48. rd. (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976». 
49. See Northcoost, 136 F.3d at 668. 
50. rd. (quoting National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 
4332(2)(C». 
51. Northcoost, 136 F.3d at 670. 
52. See id. at 669-70. 
53. See id. at 670. 
54. See id. 
55. Seeid. 
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there are exceptions. 57 A court's review may extend outside the 
administrative record: "(1) if necessary to determine 'whether 
the agency has considered all relevant factors and has ex-:-
plained its decision,' (2) 'when the agency has relied on docu-
ments not in the record,' or (3) 'when supplementing the record 
is necessary to explain technical terms or complex subject mat-
ter,' and (4) 'when the plaintiffs make a showing of agency bad 
faith."'58 While NEC pointed to the second exception, the Ninth 
Circuit noted that since the administrative record was small, 
"it certainly would have been proper for the district court to 
consider Plaintiffs' exhibits. "59 The court agreed, nonetheless, 
with the district court's rationale for striking the exhibits. 60 
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by striking "cumulative and unnecessary documents 
outside the administrative record," even though it would have 
been proper to consider them. 61 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF DECISION 
In the Ninth Circuit, the determination as to which stan-
dard of review applies depends on whether the underlying is-
sue is characterized as either legal or factual. Legal issues, 
such as whether an EIS is required, receive a "reasonableness" 
standard of review. Factual disputes, such as a rmding of no 
significant impact,· are reviewed under the "arbitrary and ca-
pricious" standard. However, since the opinions in Greenpeace, 
Alaska Wilderness, and Northcoast do not clearly distinguish a 
legal from a factual issue, the question of which standard to 
apply remains unclear. 
57. See id. 
58. [d. (quoting Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Service, 
100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th Cir. 1996». 
59. Northcoast, 136 F.3d at 665. 
60. See id. The district court believed it was statutorily limited to a review of the 
administrative record, but that, in addition, admitting the exhibits would have been 
cumulative. See id. 
6!. [d. 
8
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In Northcoast, the court stated that it assumed the issue 
was legal since no facts were in dispute. 62 Thus, perhaps one 
indication of the difference between factual and legal issues is 
whether the parties dispute the underlying facts. 63 However, 
this classification method fails to address instances where a 
legal issue exists whose underlying facts are also in dispute. 
The resolution of this question remains for future courts. 
However, regardless of the theoretical application of the 
"reasonableness" standard to legal disputes or the "arbitrary 
and capricious" standard to factual disputes, the practical dif-
ference between what is "reasonable" and what is "arbitrary 
and capricious" may not be that substantial. As the Supreme 
Court noted in Marsh, its decision "[does] not require a sub-
stantial reworking of long established NEPA law" since several 
circuit courts had already recognized that the "difference be-
tween the 'arbitrary and capricious' and 'reasonableness' stan-
dards is not of great pragmatic consequence."64 
In this case, although the Ninth Circuit applied the "rea-
sonableness" standard of review', it is questionable whether an 
application of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard would 
have caused a different result. The court applied the "reason-
ableness" standard based on its finding of a legal dispute. 
Rather than evaluate the EA itself, however, the court relied 
upon and deferred to the agency's determination that the proj-
ects were merely for research and had no effect upon the envi-
62. See Northcoast Environmental Center v. Glickman, 136 F.3d at 667 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
63. In Hells Canyon Preseroation Council v. Jacoby, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D. Or. 
1998), which relied on the Northcoast decision, the court decided that the issue was 
factual and therefore used the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. See id. at 1232. In 
Hells Canyon, the plaintiffs challenged an agency's classification of a project as a cate-
gorical exclusion to NEPA. See id. at 1235. The classification was based on factual 
determinations by the agency's experts, thus triggering the "arbitrary and capricious" 
standard. See id. 
64. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 n.23 (1989). 
For example, in Manasota-88, Inc. v. Thomas, 799 F.2d 687 (11th Cir. 1986), the court 
said, "[als a practical matter, ... the differences between the 'reasonableness' and 'arbi-
trary and capricious' standards of review are often difficult to discern." Id. at 692 n.8. 
Likewise, in River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of United States Army, 764 
F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1985), the court ststed, "[wle are not sure how much if any practical 
difference there is between 'abuse of discretion' and 'unreasonable.m [d. at 449. 
9
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ronment. Under the "reasonableness" standard, a court is pre-
sumed to be less deferential, and yet the court deferred to the 
agency in this case. Thus, the court's decision actually weak-
ened the distinction between the "reasonableness" and the "ar-
bitrary and capricious" standards. 
Lisa Braly· 
• Golden Gate University School of Law. Class of 2000. 
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